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ABSTRZCr
Nursinghome expenditures have become a public policy concern primarily
because the Medicaid program payes forapproximately50 percent. Medicaid
makes health care available to individuals who otherwise could not afford it,
by directly reimbursing nursing homes for Medicaid patient care. Typically,
Medicaid reimbursement rates are set by a cost plus method, where the
reimbursement per patient is equal to average cost plus some return referred
to as the Medicaid 'plus" factor. This paper estimates the elasticity of
Medicaid expenditures with respect to a change in the Medicaid "plus" factor,
and decomposes that elasticity into price, quality, and quantity components.
The decomposition is derived from a model of nursing home behavior, which
shows that an increase in the Medicaid "plus" factor causes nursing homes to
admit more Medicaid patients and reduce quality.
Total expenditures are the Medicaid reimbursement rate times the number
of Medicaid patients receiving care. An increase in the Medicaid 'plus' factor
affects the Medicaid reimbursement by directly raising the Medicaid 'plus
factor, and by indirectly decreasing average cost through a reduction in
quality. These are the price and quality effects, respectively. The quantity
effect is change in the number of Medicaid patients. The elasticities are
estimated separately for proprietary and "not for profit" nursing homes using
a 1980 sample of New York nursing homes. Uniformly, the proprietary
elasticities are approximately twice as large as the "not for profit"
elasticities. As expected the price and quantity effects are positive, and trie
quality effects are negative. In the decomposition, the quality effect is
quite important. In fact, ignoring it would lead to a fifty—three percent
overestimate of the Medicaid expenditure elasticity.
Paul J. Gertler
Depaxtrrentof Economics
State University of NewYork
Stony Brook, NewYork117941. INTRODUCTION
Nursing home expenditures have become a public policy concern primarily
because government programs pay for approximately 50 percent of the
expenditures. Specificafly, in 1983, government expenditures accounted for $14
billion out of the $28.4 billion spent on nationally Nursing home care.
Moreover, opproxlrrtety 90 percent of the public expenditures were financed
through the Medicaid program.1
The Medicaid program makes health care available to individuals who
otherwise could not afford it. It is jointly financed by State and Federal
governments, bt administered on a State bas4s. Medicaid reimburses nursing
homes a set fee for the care of Medicaid patients. Typically, Medicaid
reimbursement rates are set by a cost plus method, where the reimbursement per
patient is equal to average cost plus some return referred to as the Medicaid
pus" factor.2 This paper estimates the elasticity of MedIcaid expenditures
with respect to a change in the Meaicald "plus" factor, and decomposes that
elasticity Into price, quality, anu quantity components.
The decomposition is derived from a model of nursing home behavior, which
Is determined to a large extent by government regulation. Specifically, the
Medicaid program allows nursing homes to price discriminate between patients
who finance their care privately ano patients whose care is financed by
Medicaia. Nevertheless, nursing homes are required to provide the same quality
to both types of patients. Finally, the total number of patients (capacity) is
limited by the Certificate of Need (CON) cost containment program.3
In essence, the Medicaid program creates a second market for nursing home
care, and CON restricts supply so that there is excess Medicaid demand.4
Therefore, Medicaid demand is perfectly elastic at the Medicaid reimbursement
rate, while "private pay" demand is sensitive to price and quality. Hence,
nursing homes compete for "private pay" patients knowing that they can always
admit Medicaid patients at the Medicaid reimbursement rate If they have excess
capacity. Quality is determined by the "private pay" market. The greater is
"private pay" demand relative to Medicaid, the higher Is quality.
An increase in the Medicaid "plus's factor causes nursing homes to admit
more Medicaid patients, and reduce quality.5 The increase in the "plus" factor
raises the marginal profit of a Medicaid patient. Therefore, homes have
Incentive to substitute Medicaid patients tor "private pay" patients. Homes
reduce "private pay' demand and operating costs by lowering quality.2
Using these results we decompose the Medicaid expenditure elasticity into
price, quality, and quantity effects. Total expenditures are the Medicaid
reimbursement rate times the number of Medicaid patients receiving care. An
Increase In the Medicaid "plus' factor affects the Medicaid reimbursement rate
two ways: (1) by directly raising the Medicaid "plus" factor, and (ii) by
Indirectly decreasing average cost through a reduction In quality. These are
the price and quality effects, respectively. The price effect is positive,
while the quality effect is negative. Finally, the quantity effect Is
positive, as the rise In the "plus" factor causes homes to Increase their
number of Medicaid patients.
The elasticities are estimated separately for proprietary and "not for
profit" nursing homes using a 1980 sample of New York nursing homes.
Uniformly, the proprietary elasticities are approximately twice as large as
the "not for profit" elasticities. Specifically, the total proprietary
Medicaid expenditure elasticity is .117, and the "not for profit" elasticity
Is .061. As expected the price and quantity effects are positive, and the
quality effects are negative. Translating these elasticities Into dollars
shows that a one percent rise in the Medicaid "plus" factor ($.68 per patient
day for proprietary homes, and .$.42 per patient day for "not for profit"
homes) leads to approximately $1,317 million increase in annual Medicaid
expenditures.
In the decomposition, the quality effect is quite Important. In fact,
ignoring It would lead to a substantial overestimate of the Medicaid
expenditure elasticity. The quality effect is —.064 for proprietary homes and
—.027 for "not for profit" homes. In dollar terms, the quality effect of a one
percent rise in the Medicaid "plus" factor amounts to a decrease of
approximately $694 million In Medicaid expenditures. Hence, if the quality
effect were Ignored, the expenditure elasticity would be overstated by
approximately fifty three percent.
The theoretical analysis presented in section II and is based on Gertler
(1985a) and (1985b). The model employs the notion that there are quantity and
quality aspects to production, and both quantity and quality are endogenous.6
Specifically, nursing homes produce a series of commodities, such as medical
care, room and board, and social activIties. The quality of nursing home care
is the utility patients derive from consuming this package. Nursing home
output, then, Is characterized by the total number of patients and average
quality. The decomposition of the Medicaid elasticity is derived in section
III, and estimated In section IV. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section V.3
II. A THEORY OF NURSING HOMEBEHAVIOR
A. Assimtptions and Notation
Nursing homes face "private pay" and Medicaid demand. "Private pay"
demand is given by X(P,Q), where X is the number of "private pay' patients,
p Is the price charged "private pay" patients, and 0 is average quality.
"Private pay" demand Is increasing In Q,and decreasing in P. In contrast,
Medicaid demand is perfectly elastic at the Medicaid reimbursement rate.
CON imposes a capacity constraint on each home. Since there is excess
Medicaid demand, the constraint is binding. It is specified as
(1) X+M =
whereM is the number of Medicaid patients and Risthe CON allowed capacity.
Nursing homes are required to provide afl patients with the same level of
quality. Therefore, a nursing home's cost function can be specified as a
function of the total number of patients receiving care and average quality.
Let the cost function for providing quality level 0 to R patients be given by
C(O). It is assumed to be increasing and convex.
Finafly, Medicaid reimburses a nursing home Its average cost plus r, the
Medicaid "plus" factor. Hence, the Medicaid reimbursement per patient is
(2) R =r+C(Q)/R.
B. Proprietary Nursing Home Behavior
Homes choose "private pay" price and quality so as to maximize profits
subject to the CON capacity constraint. The profit function is
(3) II P X(P,Q) +R{R — X(P,Q) —C(Q).
The first order conditions are
(4) PXp +X=RXp
(5) P =(X/R) C0 + RX0.
"Private pay" price is chosen in (4) such that marginal "private pay" revenue
equals the opportunity cost of Medicaid revenue, and quality is chosen in (5)
such that marginal "private pay" revenue equals the marginal cost of quality
plus the opportunity cost of Medicaid revenue. Since the cost of caring for4
plus theopportunitycost of Medicaid revenue. Since the cost of caring for
Medicaid patients is recovered via Medicaid reimbursement, the marginal cost
of quality is weighted by the proportion of "private pay' patients.
An increase in the Medicaid 'plus" factor causes nursing homes to
increase its number of Medicaid patients and lower quality.7 The rationale
behind this result is that an increase In r raises marginal Medicaid revenue,
making Meaicaid patients more profitable. Therefore, (since the CON capacity
constraint Is binding) homes want to substitute Medicaid patients for "private
pay" patients. Homes can reduce "private pay' demand by increasng theIr
"private pay" price and by lowering their quality. They surely lower quality,
since that also reduces their operating costs,
C. "Not For Profit" Nursing Home Behavior
Unlike proprietary nursing homes, the objectives of "not for profit"
homes are not well defined. Economists typically model "not for profit" firms
as utility maximizers.8 The arguments of a "not for profit" firm's utility
function are debatable ard depend upon the Institutional setting. In the
nursing home industry, where the religious institution dominates, we assume
that not for profit homes are basically altruistic in nature, Therefore, we
expect these homes to be concerned with quality, and with providing care to
the poor. Hence, the "not for profit" nursing home's utility function is
assumed to be an increasing function of quality and the number of Medicaid
patients. "Not for profit" nursing homes are assumed to choose "private pay"
price and quality so as to maximize utility subject to the CON capacity
corstraint and subject to a break even constraint.9
Let G(OM) be the nursing home's utility function, and A the Lagrange
multiplier on the break even constraint. Then, assuming that the Kuhn—Tucker
conditions are are satisfied at an interior solution, the first order
cor'ditions are
(6) p +x — (1/X)GM =R
(7) p +(1/A)(GQ —GMX0) (X/) C0 +RX0.
"Private pay" price Is chosen in (6) such that marginal "private pay" revenue
plus the marginal utility of Medicaid patients equals the opportunity cost of
Medicaid revenue, and quality is chosen in (7) such that the marginal "private
pay" revenue pius the marginal utility of quality equals the marginal cost of
qul1ty and marginal opportunity cost of Medicaid revenue.5
An adjustment intheMedicaid plus" factor affects the "riotforprofit"
nur5ng home's first order conditions in exactly the same way as it affects
the proprietary first order conditions. Therefore, the directions of "not for
Drofit nursing homes responses to policy changes are the same as proprietary
nursing homes responses, but magnitudes of response may differ.1°
III. A DECOMPOSITION OF THE MEDICAID EXPENDITURE ELASTICITY
Total Medicaid nursing home expenditures, denoted E, are defined as the
Medicaid reimbursement rate times the number of Medicaio patients receiving
care:
(8) E =RM.
Differentiation o (8) wIth respect to the Medicaid "plus factor yields
8C 80M 8M
(9) —= M+ —+ —R.
80 8r'
In (9) the change E with respect to a change in r Is decomposed into three
effects: (I) a price effect, (ii) a quality effect, and a (lii) quantity
effect. The first term in (9) is the price effect, which Is just the direct
effect of a change In r on P. That magnitude is one times the number of
MedicaId patients. The second term is the quality effect, which is the
indirect effect on P via a change in average cost. Specifically, an increase
in r Is incentive for homes to reduce quality. If the cost function is convex
In quality, then average cost falls. The magnitude of the Indirect effect Is
the change In average cost times the number of Medicaid patients. The third
term is the quantity effect. An increase In r is Incentive for homes to
increase their number of Medicaid patients. The magnitude of the quantity
effect is the change in the number of Medicaid patients times the Medicaid
reimbursement rate.6




where 1E is the elasticity of Medicaid expenditures with respect to a change
in r, Is the elasticity of tota1 cost with respect to a change in r, and
is the elasticity of the number of Medicaid patients with respect to a change
in r.'1 The Medicaid expenditure elasticity In (10) is decomposed into three
terms: (I) the ratio of the Medicaid "plus" factor to the reimbursement rate,
which is the price effect, (ii) the cost elasticity weighted by the ratio of
average cost to the Medicaid reimbursement rate which is the quality effect,
and (lii) the Medicaid patient elasticity which is the qunatity effect.
IV. CALCULATiON OF THE MEDICAID EXPENDITURE ELASTICITY
A. Methods
The difficult part in calculating (10) is the estimation of and We
begin by specifying a linear specification of the solution to the first order
conditions referred to as the reduced form.12 The Medicaid patients and
quality reduced form equations for 1th nursing home are
(11) M1 = +I=iij2ij + =i 1,J+k Wik + £11
(12) 01 =20+ j=i 2j Zjj + =1 2,J+k Wik +
where the ZIj'S Include exogenous demand variables, the Medicaid "plus'
factor, and the market concentration level implied by CON policy. The
are exogenous supply variables: Input prices, capital stocks and the CON
capacity constraint. Finally, the 's are unknown parameters, and the £IJ'S
are independently distributed random variables with zero mean.
Estimation of (11) allows us to calculate M by multiplying the
coefficient on r in (11) times the ratio of r to M. On the other hand, because
quality Is not easily ooserved and problems of simultinaity, calculation of
is more difficult. To avoid these problems we estimate a reduced form cost7




Substitutionof (12) into (13) yields the reduced form cost function
(14) C1 = + 3Z1 +=1J+k Wlk+ E41,
whichallows us to calculate 3) by mu)ltplying the estimated coefficient on r
in (14) times the ratio of r to C.
b. Data
The data are constructed from New York State's 1980 survey of Long Term
Care Facilities. The sample consists of 455 nursIng homes chosen from 798
possible cases. Excluded were government homes, hospital attached homes, and
non—reporting homes. In the sample are 288 proprietary and 167 "not fo
profit" nursing homes. Unless otherwise specified, the variables are daily
averages, with the unit of observation being the nursing home. Descriptive
statistics are presented in table 1.
The dependent variables are the number of Medicaid patients, and total
variable costs. The exogenous supply variables are the input prices and
capital stock. The input prices are the hourly nursing wage rate, the hourly
other labor wage rate, and a supplies price index)4 Since, the majority of
capital owned by a nursing home is the facility itself, capital stock is
measured as total area of the facility in 100,000's of square feet. The
exogenous demand variables are the per capita income of the people living In
the nursing home's market area, the population over age 65 in the nursing
home's market area, the proportion of 'private pay" patients in the nursing
home whose last residence before entering the nursing home was located in the
same county in which the nursing home is located, and an index of health
status of the patients in the nursing home. Income is measured in 1000's of
dollars, and population in 10,000's of people. The income and population data
come from the 1980 census. The proportion of "private pay" patients from the
same county is a measure of the distance of the nursing home from the family
and friends of its patients. Presumably, nursing homes that are located closer
to its patients' family and friends are more attractive, ceteris paribus. The
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Since nursing homes compete only for "private pay" patients the
appropriate market to analyze is the "private pay' patient market. Each home's
geographic 'private pay patient market Is somewhat complicated to measure
since the data is reported on a county basis. The problem 15 that a nursing
home's merket may not be completely commensurate with the county in which it
Is located. In particular, homes that are located on county borders certainly
compete for "private pay" patients from both counties. Instead, separate
market areas are defined for each nursing home based on "private pay" patient
census data. For each home, the survey reports the number of "private pay'
patients from each county in New York Stte currently residing In the home.
Homes participate in several county private pay patient markets. A home's
participation In a county market is given by the proportion of the home's
"private pay" patients from that county. Thus, a home's market area is defined
as the counties in which its "private pay" patients last resided, and the
proportion of its "private pay" patients from each county. This market
definition guides the computation of the market Variables' 16
The policy variables are the Medicaid plus factor, the CON capacity
constraint, and the concentration of the home's "private pay" patient market
area. New York computes the plus factors based on owner's equity in the
facility. Therefore, there is cross—sectional variation in the Medicaid plus
factor. The CON capacity constraint is measured as the average daily census of
patients in the home, and CON entry policy is captured by a Herfindahl index
of the concentration of each home's "private pay" market.17 Entry reduces the
concentration of a home's "private pay" patient market.
C. Resu'ts
Since the reduced form equations (10) and (14) have the same right hand
side variables with no cross equation restrictions, they can be effciently
estimated by least squares. Separate reduced forms were estimated for
proprietary and "not for profit" homes as hypothesis tests overwelmingly
reject pooling. The estimates are presented In tables 2 and 3, respectively.
The results of the estimation are quite reasonable as the estimated
equations exhibit substantial precision and high P—squares. In addition, the
reduced form cost functions are increasing in quantity and input prices, and
the coefficient on the Medicaid "plus" factor is, as expected, negative and
significantly different from zero. Further, the Medicaid "plus" factor is
positive in the reduced form Medicaid patients equations, and significantly
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'NOT FOR PROFIT REDUCED FORM
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND T—STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES
INDEPENDENT TOTAL COST MEDICAID
VARIABLE PATIENTS
1. CONSTANT _16016.50** -6994**
C 6.62) ( 3.04)
2. TOTAL # OF 5545** 1.O1
PATIENTS (13.90) (26.83)
3. NURSING HOURLY 43.38 .83
WAGE C .30) (.60)
4. OTHER LABOR'S 188.66 1.02
HOURLY WAGE (1.47) (.84)
5. SUPPLIES 5224.88** 29.55**
PRICE (3.52) ( 2.06)
6. CAPITAL 124.10* —257**
STOCK (1.82) ( 3.98)
7. HEALTH 2464,94** 8.96**
STATUS (8.98) ( 3.44)
8. INCOME 62.37 —1.57
C .44) C 1.17)
9. POPULATION 630.59** 7.09**
(1.98) C 2.35)
10. MEDICAID PLUS _48.O1* .25
FACTOR (1.80) ( 1.00)
11. PATIENTS 457.74 —12.56**
SAME COUNTY ( .83) ( 2.41)
12. MARKET 6091.84** 33.90
CONCENTRATION (2.25) C 1.32)
13. P-SQUARED .94 .97
**Coefficientis significantly different from zero at the .05 level
*Coefficientis significantly different from zero at the .10 level12
Using these results we estimate the Medicaid expenditure elasticity and
its components. Table 4 reports these elasticities for separately for
proprietary and not for profit" homes. The elasticities are calculated at the
mean of the proprietary and "not for profit" samples, respectively. The total
elascicities are reported in the last column of table 1. The proprietary
elasticity Is .117 ,andis substantially higher than the "not for profit"
elasticity which is .061.
The other columns of table 4 report components of the elasticities. The
first column reports the price effect, which is .146 for proprietary homes and
and .078 for "not for profit" homes. The larger proprietary price effect
reflects the fact the Medicaid "plus" factors are higher for proprietary
homes, and "not for profit" homes have higher average costs. The second column
reports the quality effect which is the cost elasticity times the ratio of
average cost to the Medicaid reimbursement rate. As with the price effect, the
proprietary quality effect is twice as large as the "not for profit" effect.
Specrically, it is —.063 for proprietary homes is —.063 and —.027 for "not
for profit" homes. The larger proprietary effect is a result of a much bigger
cost elasticity. Specifically, the cost elasticity is —.73 for proprietary
homes and is —.029 for "not for profit homes. The third column reports the
quantity effect, and again the proprietary effect Is substantially higher than
the 'not for profit' effect. Specificaly, the proprietary quantity effect
is .034 and the "not for profit effect is .01.
TABLE 4
MEDICAID EXPENDITURE ELASTICITIES
(r/R) N(ACIR) Nm Ne
PROPRIETARY HOMES .146 —.063 .034 .117
N0T FOR PROFIT HOMES .018 —.027 .010 .06113
In order to guage the magnitude of these effects, we translate them into
dollar figures. In 1983, total Medicaid expenditures were $14 billion, of
which approximately $9.94 billion was reimbursed to proprietary ifl5titUtioflS,
$2.52 billion to "not for profit" institutions, and the rest to government
operated institutions. Consider a one percent Increase in the Medicaid "plus"
factor. At the respective means, this amounts to a $.68 rise In r per Medicaid
patient day for proprietary institutions, and a $.41 rise for "not for profit"
institutions.
The annualized expenditure effects of such a one percent rise In r are
reported in table 5. The proprietary price effect Is an Increase of $1,451
million in Medicaid expenditures, while the "not for profit" price effect is
$197 million increase, implying a total price effect of $1,648 million. Next,
the proprietary quality effect is a $626 million decrease in Medicaid
expenditures, whie the "not for profit" quality effect is a $68 million
decrease, implying a total quality effect of —$954 million. The proprietary
quantity effect is a $338 million increase in Medicaid expenditures, while the
"not for prcfit" quantity effect Is a $25 million increase, Implying a total
quantity effect of $363 million. Finally, the total proprietary effect is an
increase of $1,163 million In Medicaid expenditures, while the total "not for
profit" effect Is an Increase of $154 million, implying a $1,317 million total
increase.
TABLE 5
THE EFFECTS (in ill1ons of dollars) OF A ii INCREASE
IN THE MEDICAID PLUS FACTOR ON MEDICAID EXPENDITURES
(r/R) NC(AC/R) Mm Ne
PROPRIETARY HOMES 1,451 —626 338 1,163
N0T FORPROFITHOMES 197 —68 25 154
TOTAL 1,648 —694 363 1,31714
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper estimates the elasticity of Medicaid expenditures on nursing
home care with respect to a change in the Medicaid "plus" factor, and
decomposes that elasticity into price, quality, and quantity effects. The
elasticities are estimated for both proprietary and "not for profit' nursing
homes, with the proprietary elasticity being approximately twice as large as
the "not for profit elasticity. Specifically, the proprietary elasticity
is .117, while the "not for profit" elasticity is .061.
The results show that small Increases in the Medicaid "plus' factor can
lead to large rises in expenditures. We estimate that a one percent across the
board increase in the Medicaid "plus" factor ($.68 per patient day for
proprietary homes, and .$.42 per patient day for 'nat for profit" homes) leads
to approximately $1,317 million increase In annual Medicaid expenditures.
In the decomposition, as expected, the price and quantity effects are
positive, and the quality effects are negative. In fact, the quality effect is
quite substantial, and Ignoring it would lead to an extremely large over
estimate of the Medicaid expenditure elasticity. The quality effect is —.064
for proprietary homes and —.027 for "not for profit" homes. In dollar terms,
the quality effect of a one percent rise in the Medicaid "plus" factor amounts
to a decrease of approximately $694 million In Medicaid expenditures. Hence,
if the quality effect were ignored, the expenditure elasticity would be over
stated by approximately fifty three percent.FOOTNOTES
1 The source of all data on national nursing home expenditures is Gibson,
Waldo, Levit, and Lazenby (1984).
2 In 1982, 37 States used some form of cost plus reimbursement, 6 States used
a flat rate, and the remaining 7 used a combination of the two. See Harrington
and Swan (1984).
The CON cost containment program was passed into law in response to the
rapid growth of the health care industry during the late 196Os and early
1970's. It requires that, in order to expand an existing nursing home or build
a new one, the government must certify that the proposed facility is Indeed
"needed". Effectively, CON limits the existing capacity of existing nursing
homes and new entry into the market. It was thought that the expansion could
be contained by limiting the available supply of nursing home beds.
The excess Medicaid demand hypothesis Is supported empirically in Scanlon
(1980). Further, there Is casual evidence In support of binding CON capacity
and entry constraints. First, most nursing homes operate above 90% capacity.
Second, there is a long list of individuals In hospitals waiting for nursing
home openings. Finally, States such New York have imposed moratoriums on
nursing home expansion.
These results are presented In a formal analytic context in Gertler (1985a)
and supported empirically in Gertler (1985b).
6 This representation of a firm's output is similar to general models analyzed
In Spence (1975), Sheshinski (1976), and Leffler (1q82), and to nursing home
models analyzed in Bishop (1980) and Palmer nd Vogel (1983).
Analytically, the sign of the comparative stt1cs In this model is not
completely unambiguous. These results are generated in a slightly more
restrictive model in Gertler (1985a) and supported empirically in Gerlter
(1985b).
8 For example see Hansmann (1981), P4ewhouse (1970), and Pauly and Redisch
(1973)
There are several alternatives to modeling "not for profit" nursing homes
In this fashion. Some "not for profit" homes could be profit maximizers who
have obtained "not for profit" legal status In order to take advantage of the
tax breaks. In this case, profits are taken in the form of salary and rent.
Other non—altruist 'not for profit" homes, could be operated by non—owner
managers who are personal utility maximizers. These managers may manipulate
the operation of the home so as to maximize their own income, prestige, and
security. The result is an Inefficient employment of resources. Hence, these
homes are not cost minimizers. This case is discussed in Frech and Ginsburg
(1980). The altruism assumption suggests cost minimization.
Footnote 7 applies here as well.
Formally e =(&E/8r)(r/E),c =(aC/ar)(r/C),and m (aM/ar)(r/M).16
12 The linear approximation was chosenover a logarithmic approximation for
several reasons. First, as pointed out by White (1980), a linear approximation
is just as good as a logarithmic approximation. Second, the data includes
several variables that are measured as proportions. The proportions already
are normalized to a base, and therefore, the logarithmic function normalizes
already normalized variables. Further, a number of observations have zero
values for some variables which causes problems In the logarithmic case.
13 Footnote 12applIes as well. An additional issue is why we use a first
order approximation instead of a second order approximation of the cost
functiofl. A second order approximation, such as the translog, would require
estimating a model with over ninety parameters. It is not clear how much
better a second order approximation Is in the case of such a large model.
Therefore, In the name of parsimony, a first order approximation was used.
14 Thesupplies price index Is total supplies expenditures divided by a
supplies quantity index. The supplies quantity index is calculated as the
total expenditures on supplies divided by an index of the price of supplies.
The supplies price index Is a weighted average of the prices of the
commodities that constitute nursing home supplies. These commodities are
drugs, other medical supplies, food, energy, and other supplies. The prices of
these commodities are national price indices in 1977 dollars, and are reported
in the Department of Health and Human Services report, HEALTH CARE FINANCING
TRENDS, 1980. The weights are the proportion of a home's total supplies
expenditures accounted for by the particular commodity.
15 The health status index Iscomputed from disability scores assigned
patients. The disabilty level of each patient in eight functional areas Is
reported in the survey. The disabilty level In each functional area takes on
one of three values: self care, partial care, and total care. The functional
areas are walking, transferring, wheeling, eating, toileting, bathing,
dressing, and breathing. Walking, transferring, and wheeling were treated as
mutually exclusive categories. Each home reports the number of patients in
each cell, where a cell is defined by functional area and disability level.
The cells are then aggregated by disability level. After that, the self care
aggregate is multiplied by zero, the partial help aggregate by seven, and the
total help aggregate by fourteen. The scores are then summed and divided by
the total number of patients times 100. The result is an index of the average
ill—health of the patients in a facility. This index is used for the purposes
of quality control (see Ullmann (1983)).
16 For eachhome, the market population Is computed as a weighted sum of the
number of persons over age 65 In each county, using the home's proportions of
private patients from the counties as weights. Similarly, the per capita
Income of the population In a home's market area is computed as the weighted
sum of the counties' per capita incomes, using the same weights,
Since each county is treated as a separate market, and each home
participatesIn several county markets, the concentration of a home's private
pay patient market depends upon Its degree of participation In the various
county markets. Therefore, the concentration level of a home's private pay
patient market is a weighted sum of the county market concentration levels,
using the home's proportion of private pay patients from each county as
weIghts. The concentratIon of a county prIvate pay patient market IS computed
using a Herfindahi index, which is based on each home's share (proportion) of
a county's private pay patients. Specifically, it is the sum of squared
shares (see Scherer (1980) pp. 58). Entry reduces the value of this Index.17
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